Selecting Equilibria using Best-Response Dynamics

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08 Septembre 2017
Types de publication: 
Cahier de recherche
Auteur(s): 
Vincent Boucher
Axe de recherche: 
Enjeux économiques et financiers
Mots-clés: 
Potential Games
Equilibrium Selection Mechanism
Basin of Attraction
Coordination Games
Classification JEL: 
C62
C72
C73

I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability.

Contact: 

Boucher: Department of Economics, Universitée Laval, CRREP and CREATE, vincent.boucher@ecn.ulaval.ca